Criminal Law

Trusts can protect assets

But they cannot ring fence assets derived from fraud

On 26 March 2021, John Bracken was convicted of New Zealand’s largest GST fraud having fraudulently obtained $17,311,262.29 in GST refunds over a period of four years.

On 23 February 2026, the Commissioner of Police applied to the High Court for a profit forfeiture order over property in which Mr Bracken had an ‘interest.’ In other words, the Commissioner sought to recover assets unlawfully obtained from Mr Bracken’s criminal activities.

The most valuable assets acquired from Mr Bracken’s criminal activities, however, were held by the Bracken Family Trust and not himself personally.

Despite this, under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (CPRA), the court determined that the trust must forfeit $13 million of its own assets in response to Mr Bracken’s offending as he had an ’interest’ in the trust property.

 

Criminals may not profit from their actions

For the court to make a profit forfeiture order, it had to be satisfied that Mr Bracken had ‘unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity’ and that he had ’interests’ in property.

It was quite clear that Mr Bracken had unlawfully benefitted from a significant criminal activity, so the question turned to whether he had an ‘interest’ in the trust’s property.

Discretionary beneficiaries cannot usually be said to have an ‘interest’ in trust property, because the property is legally owned and controlled by the trustees, not the beneficiaries. Discretionary beneficiaries do not have a legal right to the trust’s property, only a hope that the trustees might decide to distribute something to them, or that they will receive what is left when the trust comes to an end.

The Bracken Family Trust was unusual though, because Mr & Mrs Bracken had reserved a lot of power to themselves: they were settlors, trustees, discretionary beneficiaries, final beneficiaries and, as ‘Principal Family Members’, had the power to remove beneficiaries, and appoint and remove trustees.

Moreover, under the CPRA, an ‘interest’ in relation to property is much broader than simply owning something. It includes not only a legal or equitable interest in property, but also a right, power or privilege connected with the property.

In addition, the court can treat having ‘effective control over property’ as an ‘interest in property.’ As a part of this analysis, the court can have regard to ‘any trust that has a relationship to the property.’

The court determined Mr Bracken had both:

  1. An ’interest’ in the trust property both because he was a final beneficiary of the trust and due to his powers as a ‘Principal Family Member,’ and
  2. Effective control over the trust property, which was also due to his powers as a ‘Principal Family Member’ and that he was a trustee.

After much complex legal argument, the profit forfeiture order was granted with a maximum recoverable amount of $16,019,231.16, around $13 million of this was trust-owned property. The trust could retain the family farm (valued at $3.780 million), as this would allow the innocent beneficiaries to continue to benefit from this generational family asset. All the other remaining trust property was to be forfeited.

 

Trusts cannot shield ill-gotten gains

This case shows that while well-drafted trusts remain valuable and legitimate estate planning tools, they cannot be used as a shield for assets that have been acquired through crime – particularly in cases where the perpetrator has retained so much power over the trust assets that such power is tantamount to property (or an ‘interest’).

The court’s decision was said to be a strict statutory interpretation exercise, and there are clearly legitimate policy (and societal) reasons behind the CPRA having such a strong stance. It remains to be seen, however, whether a case involving a trust over which a criminal has few or no powers would result in the same outcome.

This case shows an intriguing relationship between statutory intervention and orthodox trust principles – giving us much to ponder.

 

 

DISCLAIMER: All the information published in Trust eSpeaking is true and accurate to the best of the authors’ knowledge. It should not be a substitute for legal advice. No liability is assumed by the authors or publisher for losses suffered by any person or organisation relying directly or indirectly on this newsletter. Views expressed are those of individual authors, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Edmonds Judd. Articles appearing in Trust eSpeaking may be reproduced with prior approval from the editor and credit given to the source.
Content Copyright © NZ LAW Limited, 2026.    Editor: Adrienne Olsen.       E-mail: [email protected]      Ph: 029 286 3650


Lessons from the MaxBuild and Mardom prosecutions

While New Zealand’s criminal cartel regime has been in effect since 2021, it has only recently moved beyond theory into action.

The Commerce commission has now completed the country’s first criminal cartel prosecution with two sentences imposed in the High Court in Auckland on construction companies MaxBuild Limited (MaxBuild) and Mardom Limited (formally Chelsea Contracting Limited) (Mardom), with both companies pleading guilty to bid-rigging offences.

This enforcement marks a watershed moment for competition law in New Zealand, and sends a clear message to all businesses engaged in tendering, procurement and competitor interaction.

Criminal conduct

The prosecutions arose from alleged bid-rigging in relation to NZ Transport Agency’s Northern Corridor Improvement Project and Auckland Transport’s Middlemore Bridge Refurbishment Project; two publicly funded infrastructure projects.

The Commission’s investigation revealed that MaxBuild’s director, Munesh Kumar, colluded with Mardom’s director, Dominic Sutherland, by agreeing that Mardom would submit artificially high tenders (‘cover pricing’) to allow MaxBuild to win the contracts with lower bids. This practice undermines competitive tendering, harms procuring agencies and potentially loads costs onto taxpayers.

The scheme was accidentally uncovered when a spreadsheet containing details of the illicit arrangement was inadvertently included in tender documents sent to the project’s overseers. This triggered a formal Commission investigation and, ultimately, criminal charges.

Sentencing

In December 2024, the High Court sentenced MaxBuild’s director to six months’ community detention and 200 hours’ community service, and ordered a $500,000 fine on MaxBuild for its role in facilitating the cartel conduct. Justice Wilkinson-Smith described the behaviour as ‘serious and deliberate,’ and an attack on business confidence and taxpayer trust.

More recently, in October 2025, the High Court imposed a $30,000 fine on Mardom following its guilty plea to cartel conduct.

Justice Sally Fitzgerald indicated that a starting fine of $595,000 would have been appropriate for Mardom, but the fine was lowered to $30,000 due to Mardom’s poor financial position and lack of active trading. Despite not directly benefiting financially from the scheme, the company had ‘taken active steps in the collusive behaviour.’

In both prosecutions, mitigating factors such as early guilty pleas, cooperation, personal circumstances and the inability to pay influenced the level of penalties imposed.

Why this matters for New Zealand businesses

Under New Zealand law, intentional cartel behaviour – including price-fixing, market allocation, restricted output arrangements and bid-rigging – can attract:

  • Up to seven years’ imprisonment (for individuals), and /or fines of up to $500,000, and
  • Substantial corporate fines (up to the greater of $10 million, three times commercial gain or 10% of turnover for each year in which a breach occurred).

The cases of MaxBuild and Mardom demonstrate that:

  • The Commission will deploy criminal powers when warranted – not just civil penalties
  • Bid-rigging and cover pricing are key priorities, particularly in public-sector procurement
  • Individuals face personal exposure, with directors who engage in or facilitate cartel conduct risking criminal convictions and custodial sentences, and
  • Early guilty pleas and cooperation can reduce sentences, but they do not prevent convictions.

Lessons for business

  • Train your staff on ‘informal’ competitor contact. Conversations about pricing, bid strategy, territories or customers with competitors can be high-risk
  • Establish compliance programmes for your tender applications and keep them updated. Any coordinated arrangements with competitors about bidding practices can easily amount to cartel conduct. Include cartel law training, procurement protocols and escalation points for suspected breaches, and
  • Be proactive if you suspect there has been a breach. The commission’s Cartel Leniency and Immunity Policy (here) can be a way to mitigate exposure if cartel conduct is disclosed early.

Cartel conduct will be pursued aggressively

The commission’s prosecutions of MaxBuild and Mardom represent a tipping point in New Zealand’s competition law enforcement. It underlines that cartel conduct, particularly in tender processes involving public funds, will be pursed aggressively, with potential criminal consequences.

For businesses operating in competitive markets, strong competition law governance is essential to protect legal, financial and reputational risk.

 

If you are unsure about any aspect of competitive commercial tenders, please contact us at the earliest opportunity.

 

DISCLAIMER: All the information published in Commercial eSpeaking is true and accurate to the best of the authors’ knowledge. It should not be a substitute for legal advice. No liability is assumed by the authors or publisher for losses suffered by any person or organisation relying directly or indirectly on this newsletter. Views expressed are those of individual authors, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Edmonds Judd. Articles appearing in Commercial eSpeaking may be reproduced with prior approval from the editor and credit given to the source.
Copyright, NZ LAW Limited, 2026     Editor: Adrienne Olsen.       E-mail: [email protected]     Ph: 029 286 3650